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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee

)

Case No. 20050153

Vs.
Joshua Herschi,

Priority No. 2
Defendant-Appellant )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. This appeal is taken under Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution, Sections 77-1-6(g) and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE
SEARCH WAS REASONABLE AND LEGAL. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE
APPLIED THE LAW THAT STATES: THE OFFICERS FAILED TO ADHERE
TO THE KNOCK AND WAIT RULE WHEN THEIR RUSE TO GAIN
PEACEABLE ENTRY FAILED
1.

Issue has been preserved for appeal T.P. 17 Lines 10-17.
"That's it. When they pushed the door open against some
force that was a breaking, when it was not preceded by an
announcement, a purpose and identity and a reasonable time.
Those are the two factors that they have to have preceding a
breaking or forcing of the door. That is the critical issue in
this case, whether or not there was announcement of purpose
and identity and a reasonable amount of time before forcing a
closed door."

2.

The Court should review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress in a bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual
determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and reviewing its legal
conclusions for correctness. See State v Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah
1994); State v Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991); State v Godina-Luna. 826
P.2d 652, 654 (Utah app. 1992); State v Vigil. 815 p.2d 1296,1290 (Utah
App. 1991).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant entered a guilty plea to the information reserving his right to appeal
R.207. He appeals the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress evidence in violation
of the Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure. R.240. He contests
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police
officers failure to properly Knock and Announce before entering the apartment of the
Defendant. R. 178

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of January 6, 2004, Defendant was in his apartment located at 408
West 100 South, North Unit TLW, Logan, Utah. His girlfriend, Brooke Staggie was in
the kitchen preparing supper. Defendant was in the living room rocking their 2-month-old
daughter, Taya in a rocking chair. At approximately 8:30 p.m. there was a knock on the
door. The Defendant called out while still sitting in the rocking chair, "Who is it?" to
which he received a response, "Dennis." Being confused as who Dennis might be, he
called out a second time, "Who is it?" Again the response was "Dennis." T.P.5 Line 1-9.
This further confused the Defendant, not knowing a Dennis, he supposed that someone
had the wrong apartment and got up out of the rocking chair, still holding the baby in his
arms and went over and opened the door about four inches. Upon cracking open the door,
the Defendant saw many men in his front yard. It is disputed as to whether or not the
police officers announced their authority and purpose at this time. It is undisputed that
3

what happened next was the officers forced their way into the Defendant's home with
such force that the Defendant had to cover the baby's head to keep it from being hit by
the door T.P.8 Line 10-17. It is the Defendant's claim that at no time did he recognize or
hear that the men who were forcing their way into his home were police officers serving a
search warrant. T.P.3. Line 1-25. See Addendum D and G.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The police officers when executing the search warrant tried to deceive the defendant
to gain access to his home. When the "Ruse" or "Deception" failed, they resorted to force
their way into the Defendant's castle.
The trial court completely failed to address the issue of the "Ruse" used by the
deceptive police officer. The officers should have adhered to the "knock and wait"
principle when their ruse to gain peaceable entry failed.

ARGUMENT
Entry by means of a ruse is permitted if no force is used. In other words, the ruse
will only be permitted if successful. When the ruse employed is unsuccessful and the
officers do not gain peaceable entry, then the "knock and wait" rule must then be
observed, absent exigent circumstances. State v Ellis, 21 Wn. App. 123, 584 P.2s 428
(1978).
Whether legal entry is gained by force under the "knock and wait" rule depends on
all the circumstances including the existence of exigent conditions which excuse the
compliance with the statute. The purpose of the "knock and announce" rule has been
stated in State vDugger. 12 Wn. App. 74, 528 P.2d 274 (1974) at page 78:
(1) it reduces the potential for violence to both the police officers and the occupants of
the house into which entry is sought; (2) it guards against the needless destruction of
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private property; and (3) it symbolizes the respect for individual privacy summarized in
the adage that "a man's house is his castle."
Because the uniform of the officer was covered by a jacket, and the Defendant
didn't see the badge that the officer claims was on that jacket, the Defendant was
afforded no time to form a judgment before the officers forced their way into his
residence. The Defendant was faced with a situation resembling that in State v Bresolin,
13 Wn. App. 386, 534 P.2D 1394, in which robbers entered a house falsely claiming to
be federal agents.
The circumstances of this confrontation make it understandable that a person in the
Defendant's position might instinctively close the door. In the case State v Lowrie, 12
Wn. App. 155, 528 P.2d 1010 (1974), the court found that in the absence of exigent
circumstances, it is not enough to announce as the forceful entry in made. Immediate
forceful entry is particularly offensive, and indeed dangerous, when the only reasonably
visible officers are, or are perceived to be in plain clothes. A prominently posted
uniformed officer is a great aid in establishing the legitimacy of the supposedly
announced identification, particularly when it comes at late hours as the situation in this
case.
There were no exigent circumstances justifying the officer's conduct. There was no
running or scurrying about indicating the attempted destruction of evidence. Thus the
officers had the responsibility to employ the "knock and wait" rule. An examination of
the federal authorities leads to the same conclusion. The closing of a door upon officers
not in uniform, which was the Defendant's impression, does not excuse compliance with
6

the rule requiring announcement BEFORE forceful entry. Miller v United States, 357
U.S. 301, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, 78 S Ct. 1190 (1958).
The Utah Court of Appeals held in State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah app. 1994) that
an unjustified violation of the "knock and announce" statute constitutes a violation of the
Fourth Amendment and warrants suppression of any evidence obtained as a result. The
Court of Appeals specifically held that where there is no legitimate justification for a
violation of the statute, a Defendant is not required to demonstrate a factual basis for
damage pursuant to any violation of any interests protected by the statute. Id. at 412.
A failure to "knock and announce" can only be justified if there are exigent
circumstances. Exigent circumstances might include a reasonable fear for officer safety
or a reasonable fear that there is a legitimate concern for destruction of evidence. Id. 41213.
This case might well be likened to another c^se where an officer used a "ruse" to
gain entrance to the premises. Commonwealth v Martinelli 1999 PA Super 92. Reviewing
the similarities attendant to that case and the instant case it is noted that:
"On the day the warrant was executed, Detective Sassa, accompanied
by other officers, went up to the door of Defendant's apartment and
knocked. He heard [appellee] say from within, 'who's there?'
Detective Sassa answered, 'Dave'..." "Seconds elapsed, and then the
[appellee] then opened her door part way. Detective Sassa said,
police, search warrant', and instantaneously entered the doorway,
pushing the door further open as he walked in. ..."
The trial court, after the suppression hearing, determined that the facts of this case
were supportive of a ruling suppressing the evidence the Court said, "Detective Sassa
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failed to wait a reasonable period of time after announcing his identity, authority and
purpose to permit appellee to surrender the premises peacefully."
In another case, Commonwealth v Chambers. 528 Pa 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991), we
find it virtually indistinguishable from the instant case:
"Robert Chambers began to open the door, simultaneously, the
police officer pushed the door open, pushing Mr. Chambers
backwards.. .He identified himself as an officer and stated
that he had a search warrant for the premises..."
In the ruling by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania it was held that the evidence
should be suppressed and the Court observed that in Chambers, supra:
"In this case, however, consent was not given by the defendant. The
testimony of the police officer demonstrates that the defendant never
had an opportunity to giver [her] consent and to voluntarily admit the
officers to [her] premises. The officers immediately entered the
premises, forcibly propelling the defendant backwards on entry."
The pivotal case of Miller v United States. 1958, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S. Ct. 1190,22 L.
Ed. 2d 1332, later cited when the Court observed in Leahy v United States, 272 F.2d 487
(1959), "Misrepresentation of identity in order to gain admittance is not breaking within
the meaning of the statute" [but] "the petitioner, having opened the door part way on an
attached door chain, attempted to close it upon seeing the officers but they prevented him
from doing so. The officers ripped the chain off the door in order to gain admittance. The
court held this constituted a breaking." See also Gatewood v United States, 1953, 93 U.S.
App. D.C. 226,209 F.2d 789, officers again attempted a ruse to gain entrance.
In the instant case there is no evidence of record here that the Defendant knew of
officer's purpose at the time he opened the door slightly, nor is there evidence that the
police feared for their safety or were concerned that evidence would be destroyed. Had
8

there been any, in the Affidavit presented to the Judge for the search warrant, the Judge
might well have allowed a "no-knock" provision in the warrant.
The entry of Officer Simonson and the other officers, even accepting contentions
with respect to "knock and announce" at the main door, it is clear that when the detective
identified himself as "Dennis" twice prior to entry without allowing a reasonable amount
of time for the Defendant to surrender his home peacefully and without force violated the
spirit of the law.T.P.4 Line 14-25 "An officer [can] enter a residence only if, after giving
notice of his or her authority or purposes, the officer is 'not admitted with reasonable
promptness." State v Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)(quoting Utah Code Ann. 7723-210). The Utah Supreme Court had held that a determination of what constitutes
"reasonable promptness" must be made under all the circumstances present in a given
search.
In the case of Richards v Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) the court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce
requirement for felony drug investigations.
"First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization.
For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special
risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug
investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For
example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only
individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug
activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy
evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for
were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy
quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in
preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the
individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry.
Wisconsin's blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cased from
judicial review.

A second difficulty with permitting a criminal category exception
to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the reasons for creating
an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to
others. Armed bank robbers, for example, are, by definition, likely to
have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without
too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each
category of criminal investigation that included a considerable - albeit
hypothetical - risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the
knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement would be meaningless."
When notice of authority is required as a prerequisite to force in executing a warrant
is outlined in Utah Statute 77-23-210: When a search warrant has been issued authorizing
entry into any building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer
executing the warrant may use force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or he is not
admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not gibe notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the object of the
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm
may result to any person if notice were given.

The FOURTH AMENDMENT [U.S. Constitution] - The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
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supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.1

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in their denial to suppress the evidence that was gathered after
an unlawful entry. The police officers forced their way into the Defendant's residence
without first adhering to the "knock and wait" rule. There were no exigent circumstances
that would permit the conduct at issue.
Wherefore the Defendant requests that the Appellate Court reverse the trial court's
decision and grant the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
Dated this

/%

day of September, 2005

David M. Perry
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this f3

day of dtyM^A

. 2005,1 caused to copies of the

foregoing appellate brief to be delivered to the following:
Mathew D. Bates
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0804

ADDENDUM
—A—
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BRUCE WARD, UBN 7666
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
11 WEST 100 NORTH
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
TELEPHONE: (435) 716-8361

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTI ON
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.

Case No. 041100017
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI,
Defendant.

Judge Thomas Willmore

It is hereby, ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is, for
reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated 15 July 2004, DENIED. The
warrant was executed on the defendant's residence in a reasonable and legal manner.
Furthermore, it was executed between 8:00 and 8:30 PM which is within the statutory
definition of "daytime service." See, Utah Code anno. 77-23-201.
DATED this %(p day of July, 2004

ADDENDUM
—B—

u

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH,

*
Plaintiff,

*

v.

*

JOSHUA G. HERSCHI,

*

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No: 041100017 FS

*
*

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Each party filed a
memorandum in support of their positions on the motion. A hearing was held on May 18,2004.
At the hearing, Mr. Herschi testified together with Detective Dennis Simonson and Deputy Bill
Nyberg.
There are two issues raised in Defendant's Motion to Suppress. First, what constitutes
"knock and announce" by an officer in serving a search warrant? Second, is serving a warrant at
8:30 p.m. a proper service during the "daytime"?
1. What constitutes knock and announce by an officer while serving a search warrant?
On January 6,2004, Officer Simonson obtained a search warrant for Defendant's house.
Defendant does not contest the validity of the search warrant. Defendant only contests the
execution of the search warrant.
The search warrant was served on Defendant's residence on January 6,2004, between
8:00 and 8:30 p.m. The warrant was served by Detective Simonson and Deputy Nyberg. Many of
the facts on how the warrant was served are not disputed by the Defendant. The witnesses agree
that Detective Simonson knocked on the door to the residence. A male voicefrominside the
house responded by asking "Who is it?" Detective Simonson answered "Dennis." The male voice

1

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 041100017 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this / &

NAME
A. W. LAURITZEN
ATTORNEY DEF
15 E 600 N
P.O. BOX 171
LOGAN, UT 84321-0171
BRUCE WARD
ATTORNEY PLA
11 W 100 N
LOGAN UT 84321

day of

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATS OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 041100017 FS

JOSHUA G HERSCHI,
Defendant
Custody: Prison

Judge:
Date:

THOMAS WILLMORE
January 18, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
lesliec
Prosecutor: WARD, BRUCE G
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAURITZEN, ARDEN W
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 19, 1984
Video
Tape Count: 3 : 56

CHARGES
POSS W/INTENT TO DIST CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 09/16/2004 {Guilty Plea}
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 09/16/2004 (Guilty Plea}
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 09/16/2004 (Guilty Plea}
POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 09/16/2004 (Guilty Plea}
USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty
- Disposition: 09/16/2004 (Guilty Plea}

Page 1

%

>Case Nor 041100017
Date:
Jan 18, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST
CONTR/CNTRF-T SUBST a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY
RESTRICTED a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Sentence will run concurrent.

SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 3 65 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is
Page 2

Case No:- 041100017
Date:
Jan 18, 2005
365 day(s).
Commitment is to begin immediately.

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Defendant will serve an indeterminate term in jail not to exceed 1
year. After serving 8 months in jail, he can be released to enter
the Northern Utah Community Correctional Center.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Charge
Charge
v-narge
Charge

#
#
#
#

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$1162.16
$2500.00

2
3
4
5

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$2500.00
$0
$1162.16
$2500.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE
Upon successful completion of the NUCCC program, the entire fine
will be suspended.
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Fine will be paid through Adult Probation and Parole on a schedule
set up by probation.
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.

Page 3

Case No
Date

041100017
Jan 18, 2005

PROBATION CONDITIONS
No association with known criminals, drug dealers or users.
Defendant will enter into agreement with Probation and abide by all
terms and conditions.
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent no places alcohol
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store.
Violate no laws.
Submit to random search and seizure.
Submit to alcohol & drug testing and urinalysis upon request of law
enforcement, probation officer or substance abuse counselor.
Undergo a mental health evaluation and complete long term
psychological counseling plus any other recommended treatment,
including medications.
Take all medications as prescribed.
Abide by a 7-00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew. This may be adjusted at
the discretion of his probation officer.
Complete all recommended aftercare drug and alcohol treatment.
Attend 2 AA/NA meetings per week.
Pay for incarceration.
SKS seized will be forfeited to the seizing agency.
Defendant will have a written statement m his wallet on his
fridge and by his bed about his attitude and willingness to change.
Successfully complete the NUCCC substance abuse program. Failure
to complete this program will result in the Defendant being sent to
the Utah State Prison.
Dated this

^Jj

day of

(JCjAA<

, 20
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Dtun
A. W. Lauritzen (1906)
Attorney at Law/Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 171
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 753-3391

APR 1 2 20C4

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI
Defendant,

;>
]>
>
;>

AMENDED VERIFIED
MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

]•
»

Case No. 041100017
Judge Thomas L. Willmore

CACHE COUNTY
§
STATE OF UTAH
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT with this his Memorandum in Support of his Motion
To Suppress Evidence seized on or about the 6lh day of January, 2004 in Cache County, State of
Utah and alleges:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts as per Defendants statement:
1.

On the evening of January 6, 2004 Defendant was in his apartment located at 408

West 100 South, North Unit TLW, Logan, Utah. His girlfriend, Brooke Staggie was in the

1

kitchen preparing supper. Defendant was in the living room rocking their 2 month old daughter,
Taya in a rocking chair. At approximately 8:30 pm. there was a knock on the door. The
Defendant called out while still sitting in the rocking chair, "Who's is it?" to which he received a
response, "Dennis", being confused as to who Dennis might be he called out a second time,
"Who's is it?", again the response was "Dennis". This further confused the Defendant, not
knowing a Dennis, he supposed that someone had the wrong apartment and got up out of the
rocking chair, still holding the baby in his arms and went over and opened the door about 4
inches. Immediately, the door was shoved open and many men pushed their way into the
apartment. The door was pushed open with such force, that the Defendant had to keep the baby's
head from being hit by the door. At no time prior to the bursting into the apartment with force,
did the Defendant know that the persons outside his door were police officers. There was no
announcement that the caller was actually Officer Dennis Simonson, or that he had a search
warrant or that there were various other officers outside with him. Upon forcing entry, the
Defendant was forcefully pushed toward the floor, having one hand brought behind him while
still holding the baby. Defendant's first thoughts were that he was going to be beat up, because
he only saw plain clothes on the men he saw through the partially open door. It wasn't until about
the fourth officer came through the door that the officer said," he's holding a baby" and took the
baby from the Defendant. Upon getting the Defendant's arms behind his back and in cuffs, and
sitting the Defendant in the rocking chair, a shorter, bald, stocky officer told the Defendant that
they had a search warrant and asked the Defendant if he'd like to see it. Whereupon the
Defendant answered "Yes" and the officer set the warrant on his lap as Defendant's hands were
cuffed behind him.

2

2.

Shortly, the girlfriend and mother of the baby, Brooke, came into the living room

and asked to have the baby and was given the baby by the officer.
3.

The search was executed at that time. At no time was the Defendant given the

opportunity to acknowledge the police or their reason for being at his door. At no time was the
Defendant read his miranda rights or told that he was under arrest. A uniformed officer came in
later and was told by Officer Simonson to take the Defendant to jail, whereupon the Defendant
was removed from the premises and transported to the jail. Defendant was not read his rights at
the jail, only searched and put into a holding cell.
4.

Defendant was, on January 7, 2004, charged by information (Exhibit A) with

five counts of criminal conduct. An amended information was later filed, see (Exhibit B).

ISSUES
I.

WAS THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT SUFFICIENTLY
COMPLIED WITH TO SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
AS ENUNCIATED IN KER V. CALIFORNIA

II.

DOES THE STANDARD IN UTAH CASES PROVIDE A DISTINCTION
WHICH WOULD RATIFY THE CONDUCT EMPLOYED BY THE
OFFICER SERVING THE WARRANT IN VIEW OF:

II

A.

DECEPTION

B.

TIME INTERVAL

WHETHER UTAH AND FEDERAL STANDARDS RESPECTING
NIGHTTIME SEARCHES ARE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION.
DISCUSSION

POINT I.
WAS THE KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AS

3

ENUNCIATED IN KER V. CALIFORNIA
5.

Implicit in the Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and

seizures is a recognition of certain guarantees of individual freedom extended to all persons
within the United States of America. That safeguard has been declared to be "...the very essence
of constitutional liberty [the guaranty of which] is as important and as imperative as are the
guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen ..." Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) as quoted in Ker v. California 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623,10 L. Ed. 2d
726(1963). The language of the amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects
all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent, and unquestionably extends
to protected premises wherein a search was made.
6.

It is the method of entry that is the first question presented by this case. In cases

construing the Fourth Amendment, it has long been recognized that holdings addressing the
lawfulness of an arrest with respect to federal prosecutions is to be extended to prosecutions
understate law. See Miller vs. United States 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958), Mapp vs. Ohio 367 U.S.
643 (1961), cf Wolfe vs. Colorado 338 U.S. 25, 27(1948).
7.

Various statutes provide that peace officers, in order to break into a dwelling place

for the purpose of service of Warrant, be it for arrest or authorizing a search, must first demand
admittance and explain their purpose; these statutes find their impetus in cases construing the
constitutional provision. Whether the requirement was fully satisfied in the instant case by the
methods employed by Plaintiff must be analyzed in light of current law. It is of primary
importance that constitutional guarantees be enforced so as to prevent unreasonable invasions of
the repose of persons, as to their homes and/or papers and/or effects.
4

8.

Reasonableness, as defined with respect to the Fourth Amendment, is a concept

developed in the laboratory provided by many decades of federal litigation. It is generally held
that state searches and seizures are to be subjected, by the Supremacy Clause, to the same
analysis as that developed in the federal system.1
9.

Defendant maintains here that the officer failed to adequately identify himself

and/or announce his mission before intruding by exertion of force to open Defendants door. It is
firmly established that an announcement by police officers of purpose and authority before
breaking into an individual's home is no mere procedural nicety or formality, but is necessitous
preamble prior to the service and execution of a warrant. Decisions in both the federal and state
courts have recognized, as did the English courts, that those requirements are of the essence with
respect to the substantive protections which safeguard individual liberty.
POINT II.
DOES THE STANDARD IN UTAH CASES PROVIDE A
DISTINCTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE CONDUCT EMPLOYED BY THE
OFFICER THROUGH USE OF DECEPTION AND/OR INSUFFICIENT TIME
INTERVAL.
10.

The "knock and announce' rule originated in the English common law and was

adopted early on by Courts of the United States. Both the Pennsylvania Court, (See
Commonwealth v. Martinelli 1999 PA Super 92), and the United States Supreme Court have
held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures may
apply to the manner of a warrant's execution.2 Absent exigent circumstances, an announcement
as to both authority and purpose is required.

1

Barring more restrictive state doctrine.

2

A fairly detailed history is found in the text of the opinion handed down in Ker v.
California (supra).
5

11.

The purpose of the "knock and announce" doctrine is variously and generally said

to prevent violence and physical injury to the police and to occupants of the protected premises,
to protect an occupant's privacy from the anticipation of unauthorized entry by unknown persons,
and to prevent unnecessary property damage resulting from forced entry.
12.

The Utah Court of Appeals held in State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994)

that an unjustified violation of the " knock and announce" statute constitutes a violation of the
Fourth Amendment and warrants suppression of any evidence obtained as a result. The Court of
Appeals specifically held that where there is no legitimate justification for a violation of the
statute, a Defendant is not required to demonstrate a factual basis for damage pursuant to any
violation of any interests protected by the statute. Id. at 412.
13.

A failure to "knock and announce' can only be justified if there are exigent

circumstances. Exigent circumstances might include a reasonable fear for officer safety or a
reasonable fear that there is a legitimate concern for destruction of evidence. Id. 412-13
14.

This case might well be likened to another case where an officer used a ruse to

gain entrance to the premises. Commonwealth v. Martinelli (Supra). Reviewing the similarities
attendant to that case and the instant case it is noted that:
"On the day the warrant was executed, Detective Sassa, accompanied
by other officers, went up to the door of Defendant's apartment and
knocked. He heard [appellee] say from within," who's there?" Detective
Sassa answered "Dave". ..."
"Seconds elapsed, and the[appellee] then opened her door part way.
Detective Sassa said, "police, search warrant', and instantaneously
entered the doorway, pushing the door further open as he walked in...."
15.

The trial court, after the suppression hearing, determined that the facts of this case

were supportive of a ruling suppressing the evidence the Court said," Detective Sassa failed to
6

wait a reasonable period of time after announcing his identity, authority and purpose to permit
appellee to surrender the premises peacefully."
16.

In another case, Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa 403, 598 A.2d 539 (1991),

we find it virtually indistinguishable from the instant case:
"Robert Chambers began to open the door, Simultaneously, the
police officer pushed the door open, pushing Mr. Chambers
backwards....He identified himself as an officer and stated that he
had a search warrant for the premises...."
17.

In the ruling by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania it was held that the evidence

should be suppressed and the Court observed that in Chambers, supra:
"In this case, however, consent was not given by [appellee]. The
testimony of the police officer demonstrates that [appellee] never
had an opportunity to give [her] consent and to voluntarily admit
the officers to [her] premises. The officers immediately entered the
premises, forcibly propelling [appellee] backwards on entry."3
18.

The pivotal case of Miller v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 2

2 L. Ed. 2d 1332, later cited when that Court observed in Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487
(1959), "Misrepresentation of identity in order to gain admittance is not a breaking within the
meaning of the statute" [but] "the petitioner, having opened the door part way on an attached
door chain, attempted to close it upon seeing the officers but they prevented him from doing so.
The officers ripped the chain off the door in order to gain admittance. The court held this
constituted a breaking." See also Gatewood v. United States, 1953, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 226, 209
F.2d 789, officers again attempted a ruse to gain admittance.

In the instant case there is no evidence of record here that Defendant knew of officer's purpose at the
time he opened the door slightly, not is there evidence of record that the police feared for their safety or were
concerned that evidence would be destroyed. Had there been any, in the Affidavit presented to the Judge for the
Search Warrant, the Judge might well have allowed a " No-Knock" provision in the warrant.

7

19.

The entry of Officer Simonson and the other officers, even accepting

contentions with respect to "knock and announce" at the main door, it is clear that when the
detective identified himself as "Dennis" twice prior to entry without allowing a reasonable
amount of time for the Defendant to surrender his home peacefully and without force violated
the spirit of the law. " An officer [can] enter a residence only if, after giving notice of his or her
authority or purposes, the officer is 'not admitted with reasonable promptness." State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 77-23-210). The Utah Supreme
Court has held that a determination of what constitutes "reasonable promptness' must be made
under all the circumstances present in a given search.
20.

It should be noted that the State, through the Attorney General's Office, suggested

to the Utah Supreme Court in Thurman that the court interprets "reasonable promptness" to
establish a minimum waiting time of thirty seconds before officers can enter. Thurman(Supra at
1256) The court rejected a strict time minimum, but this time frame suggested by the State may
provide some guidance in this case. See also United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2001) (officers complied with requirements of Fourth Amendment when "they knocked,
announced their presence, and waited approximately a minute before attempting to enter [the]
residence forcefully.")
POINT III. WHETHER UTAH OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD RESPECTING NIGHTTIME SEARCHES ARE THE SAME.
18.

The Founding fathers of the United States Constitution, as having been previously

citizens of England had a great abhorrence to "Nighttime searches", which presented itself in the
fact that in England the Kings men OFTEN ENTERED A home and roused the out of their beds

8

in the process of various civil and criminal investigations. This so incensed the Founding fathers
that they deemed this issue to be of constitutional dimension. This had not only happened in
England, the practice continued in America before the war of independence. There was a
particularly strong hostility to nighttime searches of a persons home.
5.

Nighttime searches were regarded with revulsion because of the indignity of

rousing people from their beds. See Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 535, 541,
495 N.E. 2d 328(1986). The underlying rationale was that nighttime police intrusion posed a
great threat to privacy, violated the sanctity of home and endangered the police and slumbering
citizens. See 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §§ 4.7(b). When the violation has gone beyond
a procedural rule, with its attendant potential for a miscarriage of justice, imposition of the
doctrine of suppression should be imposed based on ," (1) the degree to which the violation
undermined the principles underlying the governing rule of law ... and (2) the extent to which
exclusion will tend to deter such violations from being repeated in the future" Commonwealth v.
Gomes(citations omitted) as quoted in Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 413 Mass. 73 (1992).

20.

Utahns, of all of the residents of the various States in the Union, probably have

more reason to be aggrieved by the actions of law enforcement in connection with search and
seizures. Certainly the connection many Utah people have and had with the prosecution and
imprisonment of their forebears in polygamy cases would lead Utahns to concerns which might
be ordinarily thought to be of no great import in sibling states4 The Poland Act of 1874 actually
seemed to kick off a period of polygamy prosecutions and convictions and the "Raids" (usually
4

It is universally assumed that the Morrill Antibigamy Act of 1962 focused exclusively on
Utah Polygamy practices.
9

warrantless) peaked in the period of 1884 thru 1889.5
21.

It has recently become evident that the states must express their own analysis,

Mapp v. Ohio (supra) and the subsequent Federal cases, and created statutes that would routinely
exclude unlawfully procured evidence. Later, the Utah Court held that Utah had by action and
implication adopted a rule of law that when evidence used against the Defendant has been
acquired in violation of constitutional guarantees, its exclusion is inevitably required. At present,
many of the states have independently adopted a state constitutional Exclusionary Rule.
22.

While a good many of the concerns were on account of entries during the night

time, it was not uncommon that family members were held virtually hostage in their homes and
curtailed in their activities on account of the authorities unflagging campaign to flush out the
suspects.6
23.

Interestingly, when renewed efforts by authorities with regard to prosecution

of Polygamy, a good many of the Utah citizenry became outraged by the events of the midtwentieth century with respect to an invasion of small Southern Utah and Northern Arizona
towns by Law Enforcement of two states.
24.

A second important area of the development of Utah Law with respect to search &

seizure is the fact that the Utah Courts have not only ascribed special concerns to Utah and
Utahns based on a singular history but have closely scrutinized sister state decisions ascribing
different interpretations to constitutional provisions remarkably similar in text to Federal

5

Tracy E. Panek search and seizure in Utah recounting the antipolygamy raids, 62 UT.
Quarterly 316(1994)
6

See Generally Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children of the Underground St. Ut. Hist.
Quarterly 133(1983)
10

constitutional provisions.7 There is an active dispute as to the actual number of states where
there is separate interpretations of rules governing search and seizures between the state and
federal constitutions, however in State of New Mexico v. Daniel Garcia, cert denied, No. 27,
455, April 26, 2002, the Appeals Court assumed " without deciding, that the analysis is the same
under both constitutions."
CONCLUSION
18.

Only a "fundamental" violation of criminal procedure requires automatic

suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' only where it, in effect, renders the search
unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards. The Utah court has rejected
the idea that suppression should be limited only to instances where personal injury or property
damage 'actually occurred and has further rejected the notion that a search is made legal by what
it turns up. The officers in this case failed to knock and identify their authority and purpose. The
occupant was not given opportunity to respond, which increased the risk of violence at the time
of the entry. A fundamental violation of defendant's rights occurred , the Officers actions
violated State, constitutional and procedural statutes. Therefore^Defendant moves this court to
grant the Motion to Suppress the Evidence from the Search yVarrant.
Dated this &_ day of April, 2004.

A.W. Catfritzen
7

This was part of the rationale of the Utah Court in providing a St\te Constitution basis
for imposition of the Exclusionary Rule in Larocco.
11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE to the
person(s) listed below on this the^|' day ofMafeh; 2004.

N. GEORGE DAINES
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
11 West 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
vs.
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84
408 W 100 South, North Unit
Logan, Utah 84321

No.

Defendant
Your Affiant is Detective Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson, a police officer with the Logan City Police
Department in Logan, Utah. Y'our Affiant has been so employed for over 20 years and is currently
assigned as a supervisor of the Cache/Rich Drug Task Force. Your Affiant is a graduate of the Utah
Police Academy and has received continual training in the investigation of all manner of criminal
activity. Your Affiant has received specialized training in the investigation of controlled substance
use, production, and distribution.
Your Affiant is currently investigating Joshua G. Herschi, DOB 02-19-84 for Possession of
Controlled Substances, to witrnethamphetamineand marijuana, Utah Code 58-37-8. Joshua is
currently living at 408 W 100 South. Logan. UT. This is a 'duplex' residence created from an
original single family home in Logan, UT. The Herschi portion of the residence is accessed at
the street level entrance from the north of this white house. The house is located at the
southwest comer of 400 West and 100 South in Logan, due south of the Head Start, Logan
Center at 75 South 400 West, Logan.
The facts tending to establish grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows:
1.

2.

3.

On 1-2-04, Your Affiant received information from a concerned citizen regarding illegal
drug use and distribution involving Joshua G. Herschi at 408 W 100 S, Logan, This
concerned citizen (CC) wished to remain confidential for personal reasons. However,
this person identified themself to Your Affiant and is a resident of Cache Valley.
CC stated that they had personal knowledge that Joshua Herschi has been distributing
marijuana andrnethamphetamineto various residents of Cache Valley for months, and
was willing to assist in the investigation by pointing out involved residences and naming
involved and suspected persons. T>R06S t t 3 £ 5 Sou> iLW*&4U.«j OM i 1,-1*6-03
By way of background knowledge on the suspect, CC stated that Joshua lives at the
residence with Brooke and her 2-month old baby girl. Joshua is employed at Harrington
& Co. in Hyrurn and has no vehicle. Visitors and 'customers' at the residence were
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

named as "Linda", "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith, Katie and Eric Fletcher,
and Carlene, about 50 years of age with brown hair, from the Trenton area. CC has
personally observed drug transactions inside the residence. CC pointed out 2 additional
residences to Your Affiant involved with this group. (One of these residences will go
unidentified in this affidavit, as the names associated with license numbers of vehicles
observed by Your Affiant at that residence on 1-5-04 are drug-related and will be the
subject of a separate drug investigation.)
CC provided Your Affiant with a floor plan of Joshua's one bedroom residence. CC has
personal knowledge of a mid-sized Fire-Safe in the bedroom closet in which CC has
observed several baggies of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
Your Affiant's personal investigation confirmed via LCPD computer files that Joshua
Herschi resides at 408 W 100 South, Logan. His data also reflects that he was arrested for
Distribution of Marijuana in January of 2001.
CC stated that Robert Elsbury and Elizabeth Smith are transient people in the valley and
that they purchase drugs from Joshua. On 1-5-04, 1940 hours, during surveillance, Your
Affiant observed a tan 1976 GM Van, license number 864MNF, stop at Joshua's
residence. The vehicle's occupants entered and then left 8-10 minutes later. There were
two persons in the van which was registered to Robert Elsbury. LCPD computer files
reflect that he is a drug user.
CC pointed out a residence at 896 W 600 South, Logan and stated the uLinda" lives there
with her father and obtains methamphetamine from Joshua. Your Affiant has personally
had drug-related contacts with Linda and is aware that this residence is the home of Linda
Hyden Folia and that she has methamphetamine involvement history. Your Affiant also
knows that her father was the owner of the house.
CC mentioned "Carlene" from the Trenton area. Your Affiant believes that this Carlene
is Carlene Fite, a current resident of Trenton, whom Your Affiant has personally
investigated for narcotics violations and has an extensive history of methamphetamine
use and has associated with Linda Hyden Folia.
CC stated that CC suspected cohabitant "Brooke" (last name unknown) of
methamphetamine use. Your Affiant reviewed LCPD computer data and ascertained that
Joshua Herschi was named in an assault incident as a boyfriend of Brooke Staggi. Your
Affiant observed a 1997 Mazda, license number 157LYA, registered toKrista Staggi at
the residence on 1-5-04. Brooke's identity was confirmed by Your Affiant.
Your Affiant believes that the information provided by CC is accurate and reliable, as CC
provided CCsadentification and contact information. CC has also provided information
that has been verified - nothing has proven inaccurate. Your Affiant noted also that this
information was derived by firsthand knowledge.
Your Affiant believes that probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant of
Joshua G. Herschi, his residence and all outbuildings or storage areas, located at 408 W
100 South, Logan. Your Affiant also requests to search any of the above named
individuals and their respective vehicles if they are present at-the time of service of the
search warrant.

Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit

This is based on the aforementioned facts and circumstances.
DATED ON THIS THE

DAY OF JANUARY
%?v**—
Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson
Cache/Rich Drug Task Force

SWORN TO. AND SUBSCRIBED IN MY PRESENCE THIS THE J &£ _ DAY OF JANUARY,
2004.

J_

V,

JUDGE
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit
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DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

i

vs.
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84

408W100 South,,
Logan, UT 84321

tvotm u^r^

SEARCH WARRANT
Criminal No.

i

Defendant
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF CACH E, STATE
OF UTAH:
Proof of affidavit was made before me this day by Sergeant Dennis Simonson that there is probable
cause for issuance of a search warrant, as more fully set forth in the affidavit on file with the District
Court.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, during daytime hours, with
the necessity of giving previous notice of:
1.

Joshua G. Herschi, Brooke Staeeu their Residence and all outbuildings or storage areas,
located at 408 W 100 S o u t h ^ L ^ n ^ ^ I j ™ :iant also requests to search any of the
named individuals in the affidavit (*cLinda'\ "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith,
Katie and Eric Fletcher, and "Carlene") and their respective vehicles if they are present at
the time of service of the search warrant or immediately preceding the service of the
search warrant

FOR THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY:
Any methamphetamine or marijuana material, and any tools, devices, instruments, or other
controlled substances, or any written documents pertaining to the use of, and/or distribution of any
controlled substance prohibited by the Utah Controlled Substance Act Also any dominion and
control papers, computer records, effects, keys, photographs, and any other items which tends to
prove ownership of said property; which property or evidence: was unlawfully acquired, is
unlawfully possessed, or has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, and/or consists of an
item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, to wit;
Possession and/or Distribution of a Controlled Substance to wit methamphetamine or
marijuana, in violation of section 58-37-8, UCA, and/or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 1 of 2

violation of section 58-37 A-5, UCA.

If you find any of the property described above, or any part thereof, bring it before me immediately
at this court and make a return within 10 days, as required by U.CA. 77-23-7 and 77-23-9.

DATE SIGNED: {Jo(M\ l*J*sy <S>( 2 ^ TIME SIGNED: <$', (0 f, *>),

JUDGE
DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 2 of 2
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Page 1
IN THE FIRST

JUDICIAL

CACHE COUNTY,
S T A T E OF

DISTRICT

STATE OF

COURT

UTAH

UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 041100017
T r a n s c r i p t of V i d e o t a p e ,

vs .
J O S H U A G.

HERSCHI,
Defendant

T r a n s c r i p t of M o t i o n to S u p p r e s s H e a r i n g ,
H o n o r a b l e T h o m a s L. W i l l m o r e p r e s i d i n g .
First D i s t r i c t C o u r t C o u r t h o u s e
Logan, Utah
M a y 1 8 , 2004

APPEARANCES
For the

Plaintiff:

B R U C E G. W A R D
Deputy County Attorney

For the

Defendant

A. W. L A U R I T Z E N
A t t o r n e y at Law

R O D N E Y M. F E L S H A W
Registered Professional Reporter
First D i s t r i c t C o u r t
P. 0. Box 873
B r i g h a m C i t y , UT
84302-0873

Page 2
1
2

THE CLERK:

State of Utah versus Joshua G. Herschi,

case number 041100017.

Counsel, please state your names for

31 the record.
4

MR. WARD:

5

MR. LAURITZEN:

6

Bruce Ward for the state.
A. W. Lauritzen for the defendant,

who is seated next to me.

7

THE COURT:

Good morning, counsel.

This is the time

8

set for a hearing on a motion to suppress that Mr. Lauritzen

9

has filed in behalf of Mr. Herschi.

10

to that.

11
12

The state has responded

Any opening statements, counsel?
MR. LAURITZEN:

I think not.

I prefer to just

present a little bit of evidence and go right into the

13 J argument.
14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. WARD:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. LAURITZEN:

The state is the same.
All right.

Your first witness.

Joshua Herschi.

18

JOSHUA HERSCHI,

191

being first duly sworn, was examined and

201

testified as follows:

21

DIRECT EXAMINATION

22

BY MR. LAURITZEN:

23

Q.

State your name, please.

24

A.

Joshua Grant Herschi.

25

Q.

Where do you reside, Mr. Herschi?

Page 3
A.

408 West 100 South, Logan.

Q.

Okay

I f m going to show you a document entitled amended

verified memorandum in support of motion to suppress
1 evidence

Do you recog nize that?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q-

All right.

Are you the defendant named in that

particul ar action?

10

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And did you assist in preparation of the statement of

facts in that particular document?

11 A.

Yes, I did.

12

Have you reviewed them again this mornin g?

Q.

13 A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Are they an accurate statement of what y ou would propose

15

as to what happened on the night of thLe execution of the

16

search warrant?

17 A.

Yes, they are.

18

Q.

Do y ou have any add itions to that or wou Id you like to

19

have any of the matters stated thereinL removed?

20 A.
21
22
23
24
25

1

I

No.
MR. LAURITZEN:

Move for the admission -- well,

wouild you mark this first, please.
THE COURT:

Is that your onlyr copy?

We could run a

copy and put it in your box if you nee d.
MR. LAURITZEN:

I move for th e admi ssion of it.

1

Page 4

MR. WARD:
THE COURT:

No objection.
Received.

MR. LAURITZEN:

I have; no furth er questions o f this

witness

THE COURT:

Mr. Ward?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WARD:
Q.

Mr . Herschi, you were home on the ni ght of January 6th,

2004?
10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And sometime approximately 8:00 you heard a knock at the

12

door?

13

A.

Around 8 :30.

14

Q-

About 8: 30 there was a knoc:k at the door?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And you responded who's the>re?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And some body said Dennis.

19

and you went to the door?

20

A.

21

Dennis.

22

Q.

23

to the door?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q-

And you opened the door?

No.

Then there was a brief pause

I stated again who is it.

Then he stated again

And then after that second statement of Dennis you went

Page 5
A.

Umm, yeah.

Q

On the other side of the door you saw two men?

'

Not very far.

A.

I saw many men.

Q.

All right.

I saw more than two.

And the one that was standing immediately in

the door, you saw his badge pinned to his chest?
A.

I did not.

]ac ket on.

10

I don't think he had it on his --- he had a

That's all I saw.

Q.

A jacket?

A.

He had a coat on.

Q.

You don't think he had a badge?

11 A.
12

all

13

Q.

Not on his jacket, no.

I didn't see a badge on him at

You heard him say police?

14 A.

No.

15

You heard him say search warrant?

Q.

16 A.

No.

17

Q.

On seeing these men, and after they had stated these

18

things, you attempted to close the door?

19 A.

No.

20

You did not try to push the door shut?

Q.

21 A.

No.

22

Q.

So you opened the door the rest of the way for them?

23

A.

No.

I opened the door and it was shoved open further.

24

MR. WARD:

25

THE COURT:

I don't have any other questions.
Mr. Lauritzen.

1

J

I
J

1
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LAURITZEN:
3 Q.
4

A

Again, is your version of the events contained in exhibit
or exhibit one, which has been introduced into evidence?

'

5 A.

Excuse me?

6 Q.

The version that you say actually happened is what's in

7

exhibit one, which is in evidence now?

8 A.

Yes.

9 Q.

In the statement of facts?

10 A.

Yes.

11

MR. LAURITZEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WARD:

14

THE COURT:

Nothing further.

Any other questions, Mr. Ward?
No, Your Honor.
You may step down, Mr. Herschi.

15

other witnesses, Mr. Lauritzen?

16

MR. LAURITZEN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WARD:

No.

Anything from the state?
We call Sergeant Dennis Simonson.

19

DENNIS SIMONSON,

20

being first duly sworn, was examined and

21

testified as follows:

22

DIRECT EXAMINATION

23 BY MR. WARD:
24

Q.

25 A.

State your name, please.
Dennis Simonson.

Any
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1

Q.

2

Logan City PD?

3

A.

I am.

4

Q.

On January 6th, 2004, you served a warrant on the

5

residence occupied by Joshua Herschi?

6

A.

I did.

7

Q.

About what time of night was that?

8

A.

8:30 p.m.

9

Q.

And tell us how you served that warrant.

10 A.

And you're the sergeant over the narcotics task force at

I went up to the door.

Immediately behind me was Agent

11

Bill Nyberg, who is present in the court.

12

door.

13

Dennis.

14

said Dennis.

15

the door opened partially.

16

15, maybe 18 inches.

17

present in the courtroom today, Mr. Herschi.

18 1 me.

I knocked on the

There was a voice inside who asked who is it.
There was a pause.

I said

The person again said who.

I

A few seconds later, or several seconds later,
Approximately, I'd say, about 12,

A male was standing in the door who is
He looked at

And if I may take the liberty of placing this coat on

19

for the court?

20

Q.

Were you wearing a jacket?

21 A.

I was.

22

Did you bring that same jacket to the courtroom today?

Q.

23 A.

I did.

24

Would you please demonstrate how you were wearing it?

Q.

25 A.

Thank you.
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II Q.

I notice that you have a badge on the front of the

2

jacket.

Is that the way it was clipped to your jacket that

3

night?

4

A.

5

approximately six to eight inches from my chin.

6

Q.

7

you say?

8

A.

I said police, search warrant.

9

Q.

You did say it loudly?

10

A.

Right.

11

fraction of a second, but almost instantaneously the door

12

started to come forward, pushing closed.

13

the door and there was resistance on the back side.

14

Nyberg assisted me.

15

managed to slip in and work my way around to what would be

16

the defendant's right side.

17

Q.

Who else was on the porch with you besides Agent Nyberg?

18

A.

I just recall Agent Nyberg.

Within an inch or two, yes, right there.

It f s located

When Mr. Herschi opened the door what, if anything, did

I said it loudly.

At that point, within a fraction -- well, not a

I pushed forward on
Agent

We both pushed on the door until I

There were other officers in

191 the area who were going to assist in the search warrant who
20

maybe came up, but I wasn't aware of where they were placed.

21

Agent Nyberg and I were assigned to make the initial

22

approach.

23

because my attention was diverted to the door and trying to

24

get into the residence.

25

Others may have been close, but I did not see them

MR. WARD:

I don't have any other questions.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. LAURITZEN:

3

THE COURT:

4

further, Mr. Ward?

5

MR. WARD:

Mr. Lauritzen.
Nothing.

You may step down.

Thank you.

The state calls Agent Bill Nyberg.

6

WILLIAM NYBERG,

7

being first duly sworn, was examined and

8

testified as follows:

9
10

Anything

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WARD:

111 Q.

Tell us your name, please.

12 A.

William Nyberg.

13 1 Q.

And you're a deputy for the Cache County sheriff's

14

department?

15 A.

I am.

16

Q.

And you're currently assigned to the Cache/Rich drug task

17

force?

18

A.

I am.

19

Q.

Did you assist in serving a search warrant at the house

20

of Joshua Herschi on January 6th, 2004?

21

A.

I did.

22

Q.

Where were you when that warrant was served?

23

A.

I was standing on the front porch next to Sergeant

241 Simonson.
25

Q.

Who was on the front porch with you and Sergeant
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A.

Correct.

Q.

And some]oody resisted opening it further , is that right?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And at that point you and Detective Simonson forced your

wa y into the premises, is that right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

At no time did anyone , before the door o]oened, announce

1 that you were the police or that there was a search warrant,
is that correct?
10 A.

Correct.

11

MR. LAURITZEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WARD:

14

THE COURT:

15
16
17
18
19

Nothing further,

Any other questions?
No, Y our Honor.
All right.

Thank you.

You may 3t€

'P

do wn.
MR. WARD:

The state doesn't have any other

witnesses, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Any other witnesses or evidence, Mr

La uritzen?

20

MR. LAURITZEN:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LAURITZEN:

No, Your Honor.

Closing argument.
Your Honor, in this particular case

23

I think the authorities are absolutely clear r and now I do

24

need exhibit one.

25

THE COURT:

It has all of my argument in it.
Here it is.
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1 Simonson 9
A.

3 Q.

All I recall is the two of us.
Tell us in your own words what happene d.

How was the

4 J search warrant served?
5 1 A.

Serg eant Simonson knocked on the door.

6 1 individucal who asked who is it.
7 1 Dennis.

There was a male

Sergeant Simonsen stated

And then that individual asked wh o again.

8 1 Simonsen then again said Dennis.

1

Sergeant

A short period later,

9 within seconds, the door opened up just partially.

1
1

Aboult: that time I heard Sergeant Simonson state police,

10
11

search warrant.

He tried to open the door

12

resistance because the door was not openin g I then assisted

13

Sergeant Simonson inL opening up the door.

When Sergeant

1

14

Simonson got inside he went to try to take the male into

1

15

custody.

16

hands, so I took the baby out of his hands so Sergeant

17

Simonson could place him into custody.

When there was

J

I noticed that he was holding a small baby in his
1

18 Q.

When the door op ened up partially could you see inside?

1

19 A.

I could see a ma le individual on the o ther side.

I

20

MR. WARD:

21

THE COURT:

I don't have any other questions.
Mr. Lauritzen.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

22
23 BY MR. LAURITZEN:
24 Q.
25

Somebody voluntarily opened the door p art way, is that

right?

1
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lj

MR. LAURITZEN:

What we're dealing with here are

2 1 certainly nuances and minutia, but they are very critical to
31 this particular case.

I have cited United States

4| constitutional cases and state cases which support my view.
51 I suggest that they1re directly on point with no difference
6

that can be ascertained.

71

The state has come up with a case that they contend is on

81 point, but it is not.

The only case they come up with which

91 they say supports their view is a case where an officer
101 approached the door, knocked, and when asked who it was
111 responded maintenance man.

The person inside the premises

121 opened the door slightly, ascertained that it was in fact the
131 police, slammed the door.

And the police again began rapping

14

on the door saying police, search warrant, et cetera, et

15

cetera.

16

The individual did not then answer the door.

At that point the police forced their way in, broke the

17 1 door down, and entered the premises and found that the person
181 in the premises was in fact attempting to leave by some other
191 exit.

And ultimately, on a thorough search of the house,

201 were able to find some drugs.
21

That case is not on all fours with this case here because

221 the individual closed the door.

He was given an opportunity

231 thereafter to respond to the police, who demanded entry by
24 J knocking on the door, announcing their purpose and authority,
25

and did not do so.

The police then were able to force the
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1

door.

This is not the case here.

2 1 the police opened —
31 door by a ruse.

In this particular case

the police obtained the opening of the

Now, that doesn't just foreclose everything

4 1 from that point on.

I can't say, since they used a ruse to

51 get the door open, they are then out of luck, they have
61 violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
7

THE COURT:

8

MR. LAURITZEN:

91

THE COURT:

101

Officer Simonson didn't lie, did he?
He did not.

Who's there?

MR. LAURITZEN:

11

Dennis.

He said he was Dennis.

Now, at that

point my contention is he did not state his intention^ or

12 1 purpose, which is required by the statute.
131

THE COURT:

Okay.

What is the purpose —

what is

141 the public purpose oJLJ:he__kniDj3_k_-and___ann.Q_uiice rule?
15 1

MR. LAURITZEN:

To inform the individual that in

16

fact it is somebody with authority that is attempting to

17

obtain entry.

18 1

THE COURT:

191 And they knocked.

Okay.

So the officer first must knock.

There's no question, no dispute, that

201 Officer Simonson knocked?
21

MR. LAURITZEN:

221

THE COURT:

23

He did.

Then the next .question becomes they must

announce, right?

24 I

MR. LAURITZEN:

251

THE COURT:

That is right.

I guess the issue in this case becomes
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lj what constitutes an announcement by the officer?
2J

MR. LAURITZEN:

31

THE COURT:

4

So in other words what must the officer

say?

5

MR. LAURITZEN:

61

THE COURT:

7

That is right.

That's right.

Are you arguing, Mr. Lauritzen, that

they must say certain things before the door opens or before

8 1 they gain entry?
9

MR. LAURITZEN:

They are required under the statute

10 J to say certain things before the door opens.
11
12
13
14

THE COURT:
matter?

MR. LAURITZEN:

17

No.

Because if an individual

knowingly and willingly allows entry, then --

15 1
16

Voluntarily opening the door does not

THE COURT:

I'm not talking about entry.

Opening

the door?
MR. LAURITZEN:

When an individual opens the door

18 1 that in fact is not a breaking.

That is not a breaking

191 under -- just because he opens the door regardless -- they
20 1 can say I have a bazooka trained on your door and if you
21

don ! t open the door in three minutes we're going to fire

22

through it.

23

though in fact there's just a peace officer standing there.

24

That is not -- I mean, if he voluntarily opens the door, then

If he opens the door, he opens the door even

251 at that point, as we all know when we open the door, we have
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1

the right to either admit someone or not admit someone.

2

fact is that the opening of the door does not, ipso facto,

3

allow anyone to enter your home.

4

THE COURT:

Correct.

The

The question then becomes is

51 the officer -- the officer needs to announce who he is and
6

what he's there for at that point in time?

7
8

MR. LAURITZEN:
time.

Not necessarily at that point in

What Ifm saying, at that point in time he opens the

9| door and sees an officer there and he elects to close the
10

door as opposed allowing the officer -- no matter what the

11

officer says, if he elects to close the door then he must at

12

that point, within a very short time, 15, 20 seconds or

13 1 whatever, he then has the duty to open the door again.
14

he does not surrender his rights by merely opening the door.

15
16

But

THE COURT:

Isn't this case here, Mr. Herschi's

case, hinging upon whether or not when that door opened

17 1 Detective Simonson said Officer Simonson, search warrant?
18

MR. LAURITZEN:

19

THE COURT:

20

No.

Your client is saying no, that was not

said?

21

MR. LAURITZEN:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LAURITZEN:

Uh-huh.

He's saying that did not occur, correct?
Well, he's saying that, but I don't

24

think that's the determining factor.

I mean, we have a

25

conflict of facts here, but that is not the determining
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factor.
THE COURT:

When Mr. Herschi opened the door, if

Detective Simonson said, Detective Simonson, search warrant,
isn't that an announcement, if that was said?

I know Mr.

Herschi disp utes it was said, but isn't that a proper
announcement at that time if that was true?
MR. LAURITZEN:

Well, he does not -- even though

Simonsen obt ains the door open by some ruse, and I don't care
9 what it is, he cannot cure that by just sayin g at that point
10

police, search warrant, and burst through the door.
So your argument is that there was a

11

THE COURT:

12

ruse used that was improper?

13

MR. LAURITZEN:

Yeah.

And I'm not saying it was

14

necessarily an affirmative ruse, he just didn 't state his

15

purpose and authority.

16
17

THE COURT:

So your argument is that the purpose and

authority must be stated first before the door opens at all?

18

MR. LAURITZEN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LAURITZEN:

Yes, absolutely.

Okay.
I'm going to just -- in Lahey versus

21

United States, which was later repeated in Miller, and you

22

find that on page seven of my brief, my amend ed brief, the

23

United States Supreme Court said misrepresentation of

24

identity in order to gain admittance is not a breaking within

25

the meaning of the statute.

But the petitioner, having
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1 opened the door part way on an attached door chain, attempted
2

to close it upon seeing the officers, but they prevented him

3

from doing so.

4

order to gain admittance.

5

constituted a breaking.

6

The officers ripped the chain off the door in

THE COURT:

The court held that this

Okay.

The fact that there was a

7 misrepresentation and then knocking on the door constituted a
8 breaking, or just the fact that they knocked the door in
9

constituted a breaking?

|io

MR. LAURITZEN:

n

J
That's it.

When they pushed the

door open against some force that was a breaking, when it was 1

12; not preceded by an announcement, a purpose and identity and a 1

1 13 reasonable time.

Those are the two factors that they have to J

14

have preceding a breaking or forcing of the door.

15

the critical issue in this case, whether or not there was

16

announcement of purpose and identity and a reasonable amount 1

17

of time before forcing a closed door.
THE COURT:

18

That is

So you're also arguing that if Detective

19

Simonson said Detective Simonson, search warrant, they had to

20

wait a reasonable amount of time before they pushed that door

21

open?

1
MR. LAURITZEN:

22

I

Right.

That is exactly what the

23

case that the state would require would ask the court to

J

24

honor.

J

25

opening the door, being apprised of the authority and

The Supreme Court case said where somebody, upon

1
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1

purpose, then closes the door and upon further request

2

refuses to open it, then the officers may force the door.

31

THE COURT:

So the police have to ask twice?

4

MR. LAURITZEN:

That is right.

They have got to ask

51 twice when they obtain the opening of the door by not stating
6

their authority and purpose.

I briefed those cases and I

71 really don't think I can add a lot.
8
9
10

THE COURT:

All right.

understand your argument.
MR. WARD:

Itfs in the brief.

Thank you, Mr. Lauritzen.

I

Mr. Ward.

Thank you, Your Honor.

111 brief, unless the court has any questions.

Ifm going to be
First, the public

12

policy behind knock and announce is to avoid any unnecessary

13

violence or breaking of a door.

14

search warrant.

A police officer has a

They go to the door.

It's a knock and

15 1 announce warrant because there is not sufficient evidence for
161 the court, or issuing magistrate, to have determined that a
17

no-knock warrant is necessary.

They knock on the door.

The

18

whole point at that juncture is to get whoever is inside to

19

answer so that no evidence is destroyed.

No violence at the

201 front door.
21
22
23
24

THE COURT:

Your argument would be that if somebody

opens the door it does make a difference?
MR. WARD:

Absolutely.

Here's what you've got.

cases distinguish this in sort of a roundabout way.

251 got a door, the police knock on it.

The

You've

No answer, no response
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1

from inside at all.

It's a knock and announce warrant.

2

Well, without any response from inside at all, the police

3

then must say police, search warrant.

4 1 breaking in the door.

They can't just go

There might be somebody on the other

51 side that's willing to answer.
6

But once they knock on the door, the defendant says who

7

is it.

Dennis.

Who?

Dennis.

The door opens and they say

8

police, search warrant.

9

shove the door closed because that's a violation of all of

At that point the defendant cannot

10] our public policy to avoid violence at the front door.
Ill There's good case law that even if a warrant were found to be
12 1 defective, whether it's an arrest warrant or a search warrant
131 or some other type of authorization by the police, you cannot
14
15
16

actively resist the effect of that warrant at that time.
In the case that the state cites from the U.S. Supreme
Court, there wasn't a long wait.

Once the defendant on the

17 1 other side of the hotel room door opens the door and sees a
18 1 police officer and a maintenance man, who is really a police
19

officer, he slams the door shut.

20

seconds.

21

down and they catch him going out the back window.

22

It's only two or three

That's almost an immediate effort to break the door

The other case that the Supreme Court decided, in which

23

there was a 15 to 20 second wait, they knocked, they

24

announced, because there had been no answer from inside.

25

Well, in fact the guy was in the shower.

He didn't hear
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1

them.

2

didn!t wait long enough.

3

shower and done some other things I could have answered the

4 door.
5

Well, they break the door down and he argues they

The Supreme Court says no.

You knock on the door and

if there's no response, they announce who they are and why

6 they're there.
7

If I could have gotten out of the

If there's still no response an adequate

period of time is between 15 and 20 seconds, in this

8 particular case, and we can go through the door.
9
10
11
12
13

Once Mr. Herschi opened that door, he had no right to
slam it shut.

I think the case law is very clear on that.

Beyond that, Your Honor, I think the state will stand on
its brief, unless the court has questions.
THE COURT:

I have no questions.

Mr. Lauritzen, let

14

me ask you this with regards to your second argument.

15

There's been no -- you haven't addressed that with regards to

16

daytime, whether 8:30 constitutes daytime?

17

MR. LAURITZEN:

Your Honor, with regard to that

18

argument, it's the position of the defendant that the

19

legislature cannot alter the constitutional rights of an

20

individual by statute.

21

suggest that there's a myriad of cases there.

22

THE COURT:

I haven't cited a case to that, but I

So even though the statute says up to

23

10:00 p.m., your argument is just simply that that's direct

24

contravention with the constitution?

25

MR. LAURITZEN:

That's right.

The constitutional
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1

guarantees that have evolved around the Fourth Amendment.

2

And particularly the question of nighttime searches are of

3

such a dimension that you can't just alter them willy-nilly

4

and somehow magically, by legislative fiat, turn night into

5

day.

6

And that's what they've done here.
This is a case -- this is something that of course is

7

novel.

It's so novel that other states haven't addressed it,

8

nor has the federal.

I think what the State of Utah did is

91 follow the United States legislature, or at least some
10

administrative rule.

11

THE COURT:

Or at least California?

12

MR. LAURITZEN:

Or somebody, yeah.

So I searched in

13

vain for additional case law attempting to resolve this

14

conundrum of how night can become day because the legislature

15

says it does.

16

case of first impression, I really mean it.

17

able to find a thing.

181
19

I can't find anything.

THE COURT:

When I say this is a
I haven't been

I don't think the state has either.
Do you have any argument you want to

make on that, Mr. Ward?

20

MR. WARD:

21

THE COURT:

No.

We'll submit it.

Okay.

Ifm going to take this under

22

advisement.

I need to look at the cases again.

23

well briefed.

24

been well briefed by both sides.

25

issue a memorandum decision.

It has been

The issues brought up by Mr. Lauritzen have
I'm going to look at it and
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1

MR. LAURITZEN:

2|

MR. WARD:

3

Thank you, Your Honor.

Can we go another date for at least a

status hearing so it doesn't fall off the calendar?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. WARD:

61

THE COURT:

Let's go July 27th,
July or June?
If I can get the memorandum decision

7 J done sooner we'll move it up,
MR. LAURITZEN:
91
10

THE COURT:

Was that July?

Yes.

July 27th.

Just so you know, Mr,

Herschi, the rules give me 60 days to issue a memorandum

111 decision,
12

MR. LAURITZEN:

13

THE COURT:

14

conference.

1:30?

Yes.

We 1 11 call that a status

If I can get it done sooner I will

15

MR. LAURITZEN:

Thank you, Your Honor

16

THE DEFENDANT:

Do I come to that?

17

THE COURT:

18

THE BAILIFF:

19
20|
21
22
23
24

25 I

You come on July 22nd, yes.

(Hearing concluded,

Court's in recess

Thank you,
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